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Abstract
This study aims to investigate the impact of privatization on the degree of cooperation and
competition in a mixed duopoly market. In this market, one semipublic firm and one private
firm determine the level of two types of effort: the cooperative effort made to enlarge the
total market size and the competitive effort made to increase market share. In a contest
framework, our results show that the competitive effort level of the semipublic firm is
smaller than that of the private firm. The more the semipublic firm is concerned for social
welfare, the less it competes. On the basis of average costs, we then identify the conditions in
which only the semipublic firm undertakes cooperative effort while the private firm behaves
as a free rider. Besides, contrarily to common belief, our results highlight that a bad level of
privatization may favor the most the free rider. Furthermore, we find that the semipublic firm
always expends more cooperative effort than does the private firm.
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In the business world, many firms choose to undertake not only competitive activities but
also cooperative activities with each other. Studies such as Brandenburger and Nalebuff
(1996), Dagnino and Padula (2002) describe situations that contain both cooperative and
competitive activities in terms of coopetition. Literatures on coopetition have developed
rapidly, particularly in recent years, and the concept has been used to explain many
economic and social phenomena in various industries and in different countries. However,
to the best of our knowledge, previous studies on coopetition have focused either on the
activities of private firms or those of public firms. In other words, they have not addressed
the market where there are both private and public firms. Seminal works such as Merrill
and Schneider (1966), Harris and Wiens (1980), B¨ os (1986, 1991), Vickers and Yarrow
(1988) and De Fraja and Delbono (1990) describe this market as a “mixed oligopoly
market”.
With privatization and deregulation waves in both developed and developing coun-
tries, phenomena of coopetition in mixed oligopoly markets have become common. For
instance, the mobile phone French market is composed of three operators: Orange, SFR
and Bouygues with Orange being a semipublic firm because 18.17% of its holding com-
pany, France Telecom, is controlled by the French government. Besides competing to
enlarge their market shares, these operators created together in October 2003 a Wireless
Link Association in an effort to offer, in the shortest period of time and at cheaper costs,
the best homogenous public WiFi service covering the whole country.
Another example is the Japanese life insurance market in which Japan post, originally
a pure public entity, was reformed in 2003 to be a semipublic organization to improve its
efficiency. In October 2007 Japan Post was admitted to the Life Insurance Association
of Japan which coordinates services for policyholders, evaluates moral hazard and so
on. Japan Post and private life insurers are expected to adopt cooperative strategies to
develop their common interests. However, they also compete on premiums and quantities
to expand their market shares.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the coopetition in a market where there
are both semipublic and private firms. For a given set of market conditions, for example,
the number of firms and the timing of decisions, the activities chosen by semipublic and
private firms may differ because of differences in their respective objective functions.
Specifically, if one firm is semipublic rather than private, how does this affect market
equilibrium?
To answer this question, we consider the simplest duopoly market that contains one
semipublic firm and one private firm. Following B¨ os (1991), Matsumura (1998), Barcena-
Ruiz and Garzon (2003) and Matsumura and Kanda (2005), we assume that the semipub-
lic firm is only a partial social welfare maximizer with pure social welfare maximizer as
a special case1. This assumption is not irrelevant because privatized firms with mixed
ownership must also respect the interests of private shareholders. As a result of this, they
cannot behave as pure welfare maximizers.
Our research is also inspired by Chung (1996), Krishnamurthy (1999) and Dearden and
Lilien (2001), who model coopetition in a contest framework. The merit of using a contest
1See, for example, De Fraja and Delbono (1990), White (1996), Fjell and Pal (1996), Mujumdar and
Pal (1998) and Pal (1998) for the case where public firms’ objective is pure social welfare maximization.
2framework to model coopetition is that it allows taking into account agents’ competitive
efforts, which are neglected in the traditional Cournot and Bertrand models. Ngo (2006)
argues that many economic and social phenomena can be viewed as coopetition contests
in which agents spend resources in order to win one or more prizes. Many examples of
coopetition contests can be found in real life: employees compete with each other for
promotion in organizational hierarchies but also work collectively to develop their firms;
domestic firms compete for market share but also join together against foreign firms;
athletes compete for prizes but are mutually responsible for attracting the spectators.
Regarding players’ efforts, Chung (1996) analyzes only the competitive effort levels
expended by players to increase their probability of winning the prize which expands
with aggregate competitive efforts. Unlike Chung (1996) and following Krishnamurthy
(1999) and Dearden and Lilien (2001), we assume that each firm chooses two types of
effort level: cooperative effort and competitive effort. The latter aims to increase their
respective market shares while the former is expended to enlarge the common market
size. In other words, we develop a coopetition model of effort levels in a mixed duopoly
market.
Our work contributes to this literature in two ways. First, while previous studies
assume that payoff functions of players are similar, we consider the general case in which
players pursue different objectives and thus have distinct payoff functions. Second, follow-
ing Ngo (2006) we employ a two-stage model. As pointed out by Dumez and Jeunemaˆ ıtre
(2006), there are two types of coopetition. In a one-stage game, cooperation and com-
petition occur simultaneously in a multi-dimension framework while in a two-stage or
multi-stage game, cooperation and competition take place sequentially.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a model
of cooperative and competitive effort in a mixed oligopoly market that contains both
private and semipublic firms. The model is used to derive several interesting results.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 3.
2 The model
For simplicity, we consider a model of two firms. Firm A is semipublic, while firm B is
private. These firms are supposed to play a two-stage game.
In the first stage, both firms simultaneously choose their cooperative effort levels. The
cooperative effort level is denoted by yi for i   {A,B}, which increases the total market.
The overall market demand function is:
y = a + yA + yB
where a represents initial demand without any cooperative effort.
In the second stage, both firms simultaneously choose their competitive effort levels,
which are denoted by xi. Competitive efforts can enhance individual firms’ competitive
power and market shares. That is, if there is no competitive effort, the market is equally
divided to two firms. Otherwise, the pie share of firm i is determined by the ratio
xi/(xA + xB).
Let the inverse demand function be p(∙). Assume that p  (∙) < 0. Average cost
denoted by c is assumed to be constant and the same for both firms.
3Then, the objective function of firm B is2:
UB = ΠB = (p − c)y
xB
xA + xB
− kxxB − kyy
2
B (1)
where p ≡ p(y), kxxB and kyy2
B represent the costs of expending competitive and coop-
erative efforts respectively3.
Because A is a semipublic firm, its objective function is:
UA = αW + (1 − α)ΠA (2)
where W, which represents the social surplus, is the sum of the producer’s profit and the
consumer’s surplus; the parameter α   [0,1] can be interpreted at two levels. At one
level, it represents the weight of the government’s participation in the firm A. At the
other level, it can be regarded as the importance level attributed to the government’s
objective, i.e. the social welfare, in contrast with the profit objective. α = 0 signifies
that the firm A is solely concerned about its profit. α = 1 means that the firm A aims
to maximize the social welfare regardless of its profit.
It follows that:
ΠA = (p − c)y
xA
xA + xB
− kxxA − kyy
2
A (3)













To derive the extensive form game, we solve the game by backward induction. That
is, the equilibrium in the second stage is derived on the basis of the first stage before the
first stage has been played. Once the equilibrium in the second stage is determined, the
equilibrium in the first stage is derived by using the results from the second stage.
The second stage is described below.






























2Here we consider a deterministic outcome competition in which each party receives a share of what is
under dispute. The equivalent results under a probabilistic competition, i.e. in a winner-take-all contest,
can be derived under the assumption of risk neutrality.
3The ratio xi/(xA + xB) is concave in xi while the overall market demand function is linear in yi.
Thus, in order to guarantee the existence of the optimal xi and yi, we assume that the cost functions of
xi and of yi are, respectively, linear and quadratic.











When α → 1, it is reasonable to assume that x 
A → 0,x 
B = ε (where ε represents a
very small positive number) and the market shares are s 
A → 0,s 
B → 1.
These results are used to state the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (relationship between competitive effort levels).
Both competitive effort levels satisfy: x 
A = (1 − α)x 
B. Furthermore, the relationship
between market shares of firm A and B: s 
A = (1 − α)s 
B.
This result implies that the competitive effort level of the semipublic firm is below
that of the private firm. The more concerned is the semipublic firm for social welfare
(the closer is α to 1), the less it competes. As a result of this, the market share of the
public firm is never bigger than that of the private firm.
Several comments on the equilibrium cooperative effort levels shown in (5) are war-
ranted. In this context, consider the case in which only one variable changes.
First, ∂x 
i/∂kx < 0 and ∂x 
j/∂kx < 0 have the simple and intuitive implication that
the higher is the cost level, the lower is the competitive effort.
Second, consider the relationship between competitive and cooperative effort levels.
















































where e ≡ −
p
p y is the price elasticity of demand.
Thus, if the demand function is sufficiently price elastic, i.e. e > p/(p − c) then we
have the following results: (i) ∂x 
i/∂yi > 0 implying that both types of effort spent by
a firm are complements; (ii) ∂x 
i/∂yj > 0 implying that both types of effort spent by
two different firms are also complements. By contrast, if the demand is sufficiently price
inelastic, i.e. e < p/(p − c) then we have the following results: (i) ∂x 
i/∂yi < 0 implying
that both types of effort spent by a firm are substitutes; (ii) ∂x 
i/∂yj < 0 implying that
both types of effort spent by two different firms are also substitutes.
In general, competition and cooperation are considered as two polar opposites, that
is, a higher level of cooperation naturally leads to a lower level of competition and vice
versa. On the contrary, in a coopetitive game, the relation between competition and
cooperation can be positive or negative depending on the price elasticity level of the
demand. The following lemma summarizes these results.
Lemma 2 (relationship between competitive and cooperative efforts).
If e is sufficiently large (e > p/(p − c)), then both types of effort are complements. In
contrast, if e is sufficiently small (e < p/(p−c)), then both types of effort are substitutes.
5At present, we analyze the first stage of the game. Substituting x 
A,x 
B into equations



















2 (p − c)y − kyy
2
B










2 (p − c) − αp










2 (p − c) − 2kyyB = 0 (7)
To obtain interior solutions from equations (6) and (7), one can remark that the





− c ≥ 0
From equations (6) and (7), the following proposition can be derived.
Proposition 1 (degree of cooperation).





1 − α(2 − α)
2





. Then, there are three
outcomes of cooperative effort levels corresponding to three different average cost levels.
1. If average cost is high, i.e. c > ˉ c , both firms expend no cooperative effort. Moreover,










2. If average cost is moderate, i.e. c < c < ˉ c , only the semipublic firm expends
cooperative effort. The private firm free rides.
3. If average cost is low, i.e. c < c then, both firms expend cooperative effort.
Proof.
From equation (6), the following condition is necessary for x 
A > 0: c < ˉ c.
From equation (7), the following condition is necessary for x 
B > 0: c < c.
It is easy to verify the following inequality since α(2 − α)
2 ≥ 0: c < ˉ c.
From these above inequalities, all three cases in relation to average costs can be
derived. If the inequality c < ˉ c is not satisfied, then the best strategy for both firms is to
produce no output (yA = 0 and yB = 0). The equilibrium competitive effort levels can
be derived by substituting yA = 0 and yB = 0 into equations (6) and (7).
Proposition 1 has interesting implications. When α rises, while the semipublic firm
behaves more like a public firm, it has ambiguous effect on private firm’s behavior as a
free rider. In fact, when α < 2/3, the case 2 is more likely to arise because ∂ˉ c/∂α =
p/e.(2 − α)(2 − 3α) > 0 and ∂c/∂α = 0. This property implies that the semipublic firm
behaves more like a public firm and the private firm is more likely to free ride. However,
when α > 2/3, ∂ˉ c/∂α < 0, surprisingly, rising α will lead the private firm less likely
to free ride. The nearer α is to 0 (semi public cares less and less about welfare) or to
61 (semi public cares more and more about welfare), the free ride seems to be the less
probable. In the context of a quantity-setting oligopoly, De Fraja and Delbono (1990)
show that welfare may be higher when a public firm maximizes profits rather than welfare.
Their results suggest that, in some cases, a public firm should be privatized. Our results
obtained from a coopetitive framework indicate that in order to mitigate the free rider
problem, it is not enough to privatize public firm; the privatization level also needs to be
taken into consideration. More precisely, the free ride is less likely to happen when the
semi public firm acts either much like public firm or much like private firm. Contrarily
to common belief, a mixture around the middle of the two forms may favor free ride
behavior of the private rival firm.
Regarding the price elasticity of demand, the smaller is e, the more likely is the case







∂e. This implies that the lower is the price
elasticity of demand, the more likely is the private firm to free ride.
Next, we try to make a general comparison of cooperative effort levels which yields
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (cooperative effort levels).
The private firm has no strategic incentive to spend more cooperative effort than the
semipublic firm. That is, y 
B ≤ y 
A with strict equality when c > ˉ c or α = 0.
Proof.
In case 1, i.e. c > ˉ c, both firms do not spend cooperative effort (y 
A = y 
B = 0).
In case 2 and 3, just by subscribing (7) from (6), we get
αp













equality holds if and only if α = 0.
3 Concluding remarks
In this study, we developed a coopetition model of a mixed duopoly market. We built the
model to describe a situation in which both public and private firms determine their levels
of competitive effort to expand their market shares after having chosen their cooperative
effort levels to maximize the total market size.
Our results showed that the competitive effort level of the semipublic firm is below
that of the private firm. The more concerned is the semipublic firm about social welfare,
the less it competes. On the basis of average cost, we then identified the conditions
under which only the semipublic firm expends cooperative effort while the private firm
behaves as a free rider. Besides, there exists a critical level of privatization at which the
free ride is the most likely to occur. Furthermore, we found that the semipublic firm
always expends more cooperative effort than does the private firm. Hence, our analysis
generates many insights of interest to the government, public and private firms. In fact,
the government can use the privatization level as a mean to regulate the competitiveness
of public firms and to mitigate free-rider problem. However, it must keep in mind that a
7bad mixture of public and private forms may favor free ride behavior of private rival firms.
Our model also offers an explanation for why public firms almost always contribute the
most in cooperative associations with private firms but the former often have difficulties
in competing with the latter.
Despite these contributions, our research is incomplete in several respects. Following
two out of such several aspects are the most interesting and important. First, we assumed
that both firms choose their effort levels simultaneously. However, in reality, semipublic
firms may choose their cooperative effort levels before private firms do. Thus, a Stackel-
berg model may be more appropriate than a Nash one. Second, the extent to which the
semipublic firm cares about social welfare is implicitly assumed to be common knowledge:
the private firm knows how much importance the semipublic firm attaches to the social
surplus. If there exists some asymmetric information about that and the private firm
is risk averse, cooperative and competitive effort levels at equilibrium may change. The
extension of our model following these directions remains for future research.
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